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Abstract 
The Belt and Road Initiative is gradually moving China and its economy beyond the reach of 
Western sanctions and is reducing the economic impact that a US naval blockade could 
have. Without a measured Western response, this could increase the likelihood of Chinese 
aggression in regional territorial disputes. 
 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)1 is an essential element in China’s pursuit of becoming a 
great power. Originally launched in 2013 under the name ‘One Belt, One Road’, the 
immense development scheme has grown to become the core of Chinese foreign policy. It is 
now estimated to be worth nearly $1 trillion, with its infrastructure (both hard and soft) set 
to span more than 60 countries in Asia, Europe and Africa. 2  While the economic 
consequences of the initiative are of great importance, its geostrategic implications are 
arguably more critical. 
The BRI has the potential to boost China’s national power by addressing the country’s 
vulnerability to a US naval blockade and economic sanctions that may be imposed on it by 
other, mainly Western, states. As the BRI is gradually put in place, the West’s ability to deter 
China from resorting to armed aggression in regional territorial disputes is slowly 
diminishing. Ultimately, this would drastically alter the balance of power in Asia and might 
encourage a more assertive Chinese foreign policy. 
The Possibly not so Benign Silk Road 
The need for the West to develop a measured approach to the BRI was clearly underlined 
when Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted the first-ever Belt and Road Forum in May. The 
two-day summit was filled with enthusiastic Chinese messages about the benevolence of 
the new initiative and how it would create a ‘win-win’ situation for everyone.3 Nearly 30 
heads of state and government attended and a joint communiqué was issued.4 
Absent from the summit, however, were top-level officials from Germany, the UK and 
France, among others, while the US sent only a representative from its National Security 
Council. Western countries have, by and large, adopted a wait-and-see policy towards 
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China’s new economic strategy. As Xi’s infrastructure plan moves forward, however, these 
countries will eventually have to figure out how to approach the BRI. It is too large to 
ignore. 
Western governments’ deliberations on the BRI will likely focus on the economic gains and 
losses that can result from the initiative. Geopolitics will also feature, with concerns over 
how China’s economic power and size will allow it to bully smaller states. What is often 
missing in these debates, however, are considerations of the long-term geopolitical 
consequences of the initiative. The ability to bully smaller states by economic means can 
hardly be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means to achieve something else. In other 
words, what is China out to accomplish and how does the BRI support Beijing’s long-term 
geostrategic interests? 
A closer look at the details of the land-based BRI suggests that China’s intentions might not 
be so benign. Rather than broadly connecting China to the world, the BRI seems to be 
selectively and gradually decoupling China from dependence on the West and maritime 
trade while constructing a more industrially self-sufficient Eurasia and building alternative 
land-based trade routes across the continent.5 These ‘lifelines’ of massive road, rail and 
energy transportation infrastructure are also part of a bigger geoeconomic offensive to 
make countries in the BRI sphere economically dependent on China. Ultimately, these 
efforts make China more resilient to economic isolation. More specifically, it increases 
China’s ability to withstand the consequences of a conflict in the Pacific Ocean. 
This type of resilience will help China face up to the looming threat of economic isolation 
that is ever-present in regional territorial disputes (the US, for example, would not let China 
invade Taiwan or the South China Sea islands without repercussions). Today, Western 
sanctions or a US naval blockade would have disastrous consequences for the Chinese 
economy, which makes Beijing’s policymakers think carefully about not going too far. If, on 
the other hand, China succeeded in strengthening its resilience to economic isolation – what 
the authors call geoeconomic resilience6 – it could operate more freely (and aggressively) in 
its neighbourhood without having to worry about the fallout of a Western reaction. 
Whether China will be successful in reducing its dependence on Western states depends 
largely on their response to the BRI. If Western states sit out the opportunity to participate, 
Chinese officials who prioritise geopolitical objectives will most likely use the initiative as a 
vehicle to achieve Beijing’s wider geostrategic goals. The best way to prevent this is by 
holding China to its word when it says that the project will lead to ‘win-win’ for all. Western 
governments should initiate efforts to ensure that the BRI becomes the liberal development 
project the Chinese have said it will be, rather than a tool for Beijing to decouple itself from 
dependence on the West. 
Western governments should therefore engage China to try to shape the initiative rather 
than dismiss it due to economic irrelevance or out of lack of interest. This does not mean 
unconditionally endorsing the BRI. Instead, their support should come with strong demands 
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for transparency, oversight and equal say for stakeholders. They should also consider 
integrating Western entities into BRI supply chains and into China’s international trade 
network more generally. Such efforts could ensure that if China embarked on a conflict in 
the Pacific, it stood to lose – something that would act as a deterrent. 
The Analytical Framework of Geoeconomic Resilience 
The authors define geoeconomic resilience as the relative ability of a state to inhibit, 
withstand and recover from economic isolation through a combination of economic and 
political factors (Table 1). Isolating an adversary by means of naval blockade or sanctions is a 
strategy that has been widely studied.7 In the case of China, such analyses often focus on 
the strategic dynamics of the Pacific Ocean to understand how long the country’s military 
might continue to function when faced with a US naval blockade.8 
Such approaches, however, typically neglect the non-military components that have to be 
present for a country to live through isolation and which help it to prevent and circumvent 
isolating measures such as sanctions. To fully grasp a country’s resilience to isolation, 
questions have to be asked regarding how self-sufficient the country’s industrial base and 
financial system are; how able the state is to make up for a loss in energy supply or trade; 
whether the country would be able to apply pressure to neighbouring states to make up for 
such a loss; and how willing the country’s population is to endure economic decline. 
The geoeconomic resilience concept encapsulates these questions and complements 
traditional understandings of state ability to counter and deal with economic isolation. It is a 
tool to more holistically evaluate national power in such contexts. 
Table 1: Factors of Geoeconomic Resilience9 
Economic Factors Political Factors 
Energy. Ability to maintain a steady supply of 
energy 
Livelihood. Ability to provide food, water and 
vital services to the population 
Vital goods and commodities. Ability to main-
tain a steady supply of goods and commodities 
vital to the economy 
Trade. Ability to maintain trade flows with the 
outside world 
Industrial resilience. Ability to maintain indus-
trial activity when faced with undersupply or 
lack of certain factor inputs 
Financial and market stability. Ability to main-
tain market activity and stability faced with such 
problems as reductions in trade or sanctions 
International resilience. Ability to use influence 
over other actors and states to prevent and/or 
circumvent isolation and sanctions 
Domestic resilience. Ability to maintain political 
support and cohesion in key population groups, 
such as the middle class, rural populations, and 
ethnic and religious minorities, among others  
 
 
Source: The authors. 
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Factors of Geoeconomic Resilience 
At the economic level, the goal for a given state is to maintain economic activity and the 
living standards of its population. Failure to do so would substantially increase the likelihood 
of, and potentially provide the reason for, social unrest. It is therefore essential that the 
state and its people have access to energy, food, water and basic services, as well as 
commodities and goods vital to economic activity. Also, unless the national market is 
independent and self-sufficient, the state will need to maintain external trade flows to 
ensure economic stability. Another important factor is a state’s industrial resilience. This is 
determined by its ability to maintain industrial activity when faced with issues such as 
undersupply. Financial and market stability are also crucial to avoid financial crises and 
maintaining a well-functioning payment and transfer system in the economy. 
At the political level, a distinction is made between international and domestic resilience. 
Internationally, the task is to use influence and leverage to prevent and circumvent 
isolation. For example, if other states are dependent on another that is, or is about to be, 
economically isolated, then the country facing isolation can leverage those that are 
dependent on it to ensure that sanctions are either averted or less strictly implemented. 
Domestically, the goal is to maintain support and cohesion in key population groups. This is 
‘the last line of defence’ of geoeconomic resilience, and when it falters, political instability is 
likely to follow. 
Russia as the Archetype 
Russia is a striking example of a geoeconomically resilient country. In response to its 
intervention in Crimea in 2014, both the US and the EU imposed far-reaching sanctions. Yet 
more than two years later, the sanctions have not had any overwhelming effects on Russia. 
The country has displayed resilience both in the political and economic domains. Russia’s 
massive energy reserves are clearly one of its main advantages in this regard. Not only did 
this defuse any danger of energy shortage, but it also gave Russia leverage over 
neighbouring states. Certain EU states have opposed tougher sanctions, reluctant to upset 
their major energy supplier to the east. Additionally, Russia has been flexible enough to find 
alternatives to Western imports and exports, while sustaining vital industrial and market 
activity. 
China, in contrast, would find economic isolation harder to endure. The country’s heavy 
dependence on imported energy and its reliance on global markets mean that repercussions 
from isolating measures could cause a major economic decline. This would almost certainly 
spur unrest and severely hurt the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
Nationalism may have a cushioning effect with people willing to accept some economic 
hardship, but the existential threat to the party would remain. Only when China amasses a 
sufficient amount of geoeconomic resilience will it be able to stand up to economic isolation 
in the way that Russia has. This questions the mainstream assumption that China’s economy 
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is strong while Russia’s is weak: at least when it comes to withstanding the consequences of 
controversial geopolitical ventures, Russia’s economy is much stronger than China’s. 
A Need for Geoeconomic Resilience 
Before China began opening up in 1978, the legitimacy of the CCP rested on two main 
components: nationalism and communism. Yet soon after Mao Tse-Tung’s death and the 
gradual liberalisation of the Chinese economy, the relevance and appeal of Marxist ideas 
slowly waned in the eyes of the people. To fill this ideological void, Mao’s successors have, 
beyond promises to make the people rich, turned to nationalism.10 
Since the early 1990s, school books and propaganda campaigns have educated the people in 
stories of the Chinese ‘century of humiliation’ consisting of a number of lost wars and 
degrading invasions by colonial powers. For the CCP, aiming to maintain its legitimacy and 
raison d’être, the notion of recovering from this humiliating past has become an integral 
part of its construction of Chinese nationalism.11 
Today, Beijing is promising a ‘national rejuvenation’ where China rids itself of the last 
remnants of its humiliating past and returns to a great power status. A fundamental 
component of this objective is reclaiming lands that where historically part of China. The 
centrepiece of the rejuvenation is Taiwan; without reunification, it would be hard for the 
CCP to claim to have restored China to its past glories. Contested islands in the South and 
East China Seas also hold great symbolic importance. 
Accordingly, China is staging a military build-up and has emphasised that it is unwilling to 
compromise on territorial claims. Beijing has made clear that it is prepared to use military 
force if Taiwan pushes for independence and is increasingly enforcing its territorial claims in 
neighbouring waters. Yet as China challenges Taiwan, Japan and Southeast Asian nations, it 
faces one major difficulty and constraint: the looming threat of economic isolation. 
The Threat of Isolation and China’s Dilemma 
If China invaded contested islands or staged a military takeover in Taiwan, the US and its 
allies are unlikely to remain idle.12 Military confrontation would almost certainly follow, 
which would bring about some level of economic isolation of China due to turmoil and 
disrupted trade. 
The Trump administration’s military actions in Syria and Iraq this year point to the possibility 
of armed conflict should China embark on an aggressive path. Also, it is likely that China 
would face economic sanctions, just as Russia did after it invaded Crimea in 2014. While the 
EU may be unwilling to impose sanctions because of its economic dependence on China, it 
would most likely have to follow a US initiative to sanction Beijing to be able to count on 
Washington’s support against Russia in Europe. 
6 
 
All this should worry the Chinese leadership because the country would be largely incapable 
of dealing with the fallout from economic isolation. China’s economy is highly vulnerable to 
interruptions in energy supply and trade. It is particularly exposed in the South China Sea 
where a number of chokepoints are situated.13 Some analysts have estimated that a conflict 
could bring China’s economic development to a ‘screeching halt’.14  
Because the legitimacy of the CCP hinges on economic prosperity and growth,15 such an 
economic downturn does indeed pose a threat to political stability. Since the Tiananmen 
Square protests of 1989, the party has kept political instability and demands for reform at 
bay by delivering on a promise to raise the living standards of its population. Isolation of 
China would therefore be highly dangerous for the leadership because people would suffer 
from a real drop in living standards. Questions would be asked about why the people have 
to bear this cost and the likelihood of social unrest would increase.16 The CCP is already 
facing growing protests stemming from economic problems.17 If economic conditions 
unexpectedly worsened, the situation could quickly deteriorate to a point where the 
legitimacy of the whole political system is thrown into question. 
In such a scenario it could not be ruled out, however, that strong nationalism in 
combination with regime propaganda could redirect the people’s anger towards external 
actors, leaving CCP legitimacy untouched or even increasing it. As in Russia in 2014, such 
efforts would most likely be aimed at the US. In essence, blaming the people’s suffering on 
foreign powers may initially generate a ‘rally round the flag’ effect and promote social 
cohesion.18 However, the risk of political instability could never be ruled out given the 
strong linkage between economic stability and CCP legitimacy. 
Meanwhile, the regime’s top priority is survival and thus to avoid such risks. Therefore it 
appears highly unlikely that it would act in any way that could lead to economic meltdown, 
unless it was left with no other option. As a result, China is likely to refrain from aggressive 
action in its neighbourhood as long as the consequences (Western-led isolating measures) 
can spark a hefty economic downturn. 
The Solution 
It is by increasing its geoeconomic resilience that China might break free from this 
constraint. Such resilience would allow China to withstand and absorb the economic effects 
of sanctions or a naval blockade – thus also avoiding jeopardising internal stability – if it 
were to annex Taiwan or South and East China Sea islands. This would give China the option 
to act more assertively abroad, without having to worry about economic isolation that 
would badly damage its economy and could lead to political instability (Figure 1). 
Geoeconomic resilience is also what will ultimately allow the CCP to weld together and fully 
make use of its two main sources of legitimacy: economic wealth and nationalism. Today, 
the possibilities of severe interstate crises are dangerous to the party because it is often put 
under nationalist pressure to take aggressive action. As of now, the CCP could not comply 
with such demands without bearing great economic consequences that would undermine 
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the legitimacy it derives from providing economic welfare to its people. Meanwhile, 
stepping back and accepting a military or political loss in one of China’s symbolically 
important territories would deal a blow to both Xi and party legitimacy. 
The solution to the dilemma is geoeconomic resilience, which would grant China the option 
to comply with nationalist demands to take aggressive action, while at the same time 
absorb the consequences of such action and continue to deliver on its promise of economic 
wellbeing. 
Figure 1: Why China Needs Geoeconomic Resilience   
 
Source: The Authors. To be able to act assertively while maintaining political stability, China 
needs to develop a basic level of geoeconomic resilience that can offset the consequences of 
economic isolation brought on by assertiveness. 
Silk Road to Independence 
Understanding the mechanisms by which the BRI is making China more resilient to 
economic isolation requires thinking in interdisciplinary terms. More specifically, we need to 
operate where economics meets geopolitics: indeed, in the geoeconomic domain. Robert D 
Blackwill and Jennifer M Harris’s War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft 
expands on this and shows how different states use economic tools to achieve geopolitical 
results.19 The book emphasises the need for new thinking on the increasingly relevant, but 
still poorly understood, area of geoeconomics. 
While the book focuses on the direct ways that economic actions can create geopolitical 
gains, such as when Russia threatens to halt gas supplies to Ukraine, it does not consider 
how states build this type of power and leverage in the first place – for instance, how did 
Ukraine become dependent on Russian gas? In other words, it fails to discuss how economic 
tools can serve the purpose of building power and geoeconomic resilience in the long term 
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– creating capability and leverage that can be activated in crisis situations. The following 
examination of the Silk Road Economic Belt, the land-based part of the BRI, constitutes a 
first case study in this line of thought. 
Figure 2: The Six Economic Corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative 
 
Source: The authors. Based on information provided in Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian 
Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle, WA: 
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), p. 73. 
China’s plans for the Economic Belt entail large projects of roads, railroads, ports, energy 
pipelines, power grids and other infrastructure. Six economic corridors will span Asian and 
European countries, including Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia and others. The aim is to 
facilitate the transport of raw materials, energy, capital, goods, information, people and 
culture. The following four points elaborate on how the Belt is increasing China’s 
geoeconomic resilience. 
First, infrastructure projects are expanding the capability to transport energy, food, vital 
commodities and goods between China and nearby states such as Pakistan. This means that 
if China were to be sanctioned or isolated from other directions, there would be greater 
possibilities to expand trade and supply coming through these countries into China, to make 
up for a loss elsewhere.20  
Apart from these land-based ‘lifelines’, trade initiatives and reduced transportation costs 
are set to increase trade between China and its neighbours.21 This will allow it to shift trade 
away from Pacific maritime routes to Eurasia.22 If China opted for such a shift, it could 
reduce its dependence on vulnerable chokepoints in the South China Sea controlled by the 
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US. This would also reduce China’s economic dependence on potential competitors, mainly 
the US, the EU and Japan. 
Second, Chinese projects are laying the groundwork for what could become a more self-
sufficient Eurasian economy.23 Massive trade hubs are being constructed with clusters of 
gigantic industrial estates. Greater connectivity is likely to both boost trade and spur 
technological development. As Nadège Rolland has noted, railway networks could deliver 
manufactured goods to remote areas, expand opportunities for natural resource 
exploitation and spark the development of modern management methods – all of which 
could turn China’s backyard into an industrial powerhouse.24 
In the long term, this could shift the centre of regional economic and commercial activity 
from the Pacific to Eurasia. If this happens, the relevance of trans-Pacific trade for China will 
decrease.25 As a result, China would be less reliant on trade passing through US-controlled 
maritime chokepoints. 
Third, many states along the Belt are economically dependent on and indebted to China.26 
Most of them suffer from great capital shortages and lack of market access due to absent 
infrastructure. By providing loans, investment and aid, China is offering these countries a 
solution to many of their problems. At the same time, however, they are becoming heavily 
indebted and dependent on China’s capital and market. China has already shown that it 
knows how to use such leverage to its advantage, most recently by putting pressure on 
economically vulnerable ASEAN countries not to issue joint statements on South China Sea 
disputes.27  
If China were to be isolated by Western powers, neighbouring states would not have much 
of an option but to accommodate potential Chinese requests to prevent or alleviate the 
effects of economic isolation. In the case of conflict or a naval blockade, for example, China 
could demand that neighbouring countries supply it with energy and vital goods and 
commodities, along the Eurasian land-based lifelines. 
Fourth, China’s economy would suffer greatly if sanctions were imposed to restrict the use 
of currencies such as the US dollar, sterling, the yen and the euro. This vulnerability could be 
ameliorated if states along the Belt, backed by Chinese financial institutions, used the 
renminbi. In some projects, this is a stated goal.28 
A Liberal Geoeconomic Response 
The fact that parts of the BRI seem designed to decouple China’s economy from 
dependence on the West and maritime trade should be alarming to many. These 
developments reinforce concerns that John Ikenberry’s argument that China will be forced 
to integrate into the liberal world order may be losing relevance.29 While Ikenberry 
optimistically suggests that China will remain highly dependent on and entangled in the 
current system because of its need for Western markets and global economic flows, the 
communist country appears to have something else in mind. 
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Yet the somewhat disturbing turn of events of the BRI cannot be entirely blamed on China. 
On the contrary, many analysts see it as a reaction to the US ‘pivot to Asia’ which encircles 
China militarily.30 From a geostrategic perspective, it becomes natural for China to turn 
westward to lessen its dependence on the US and maritime trade. This increase in 
geopolitical tension in the China–US relationship can be observed in other places as well, 
such as in South Korea with the deployment of the American Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) missile defence system. For now, it does not look like this trend is 
reversing. 
Ultimately, the only way to deter a nationalistic China from taking aggressive action in the 
South China Sea or Taiwan is to make sure that the economic losses of such action continue 
to be so massive that the CCP deems it too costly, given the risks to stability and its own 
survival. The US has pursued this goal mainly by strengthening its ability to militarily cut off 
China from vital supply lines and trade. The key problem with such policies, however, is that 
they are likely to trigger further arms races and competition. 
The other way to ensure that China remains dependent on the West is by engaging Beijing 
economically. As China expands lifelines and seeks to decouple itself from dependence on 
Western countries, it becomes essential for these states to ‘be there’ and integrate their 
economies into the BRI supply chains. This would ensure that in the case of Western 
withdrawal, these supply chains would not function. China would thereby be discouraged 
from undertaking provocative action in its neighbourhood. Also, cooperation and joint 
projects in the BRI development phase would make it harder for China to act aggressively 
abroad without putting the project at risk. 
Engaging China on its new economic strategy may seem nonsensical to Western 
policymakers, mainly because regions along the BRI routes, such as Central Asia, are not 
profitable markets for North America and Western Europe. The West also does not rely on 
these countries for resource inputs. Yet opportunities should be explored and financial 
assistance, trade and investment should be encouraged when a basic level of economic 
viability is present. Naturally, decisions would be made on a case-to-case basis, but the 
overall approach should not be to dismiss the initiative due to economic irrelevance or lack 
of interest. 
When engaging the BRI, Western governments should hold China to its word when it says 
that the initiative is nothing but a win-win project. Otherwise their support will serve simply 
to legitimise Chinese geoeconomic expansion. Investment, trade and assistance should 
come with demands for transparency, oversight and equal say of stakeholders. EU member 
states have reportedly already insisted on this, as they backed away from a joint statement 
during the BRI forum due to concerns over transparency and sustainability.31 
Beijing may be reluctant to accept such demands, but economic drivers and voices in China 
are often stronger than those that prioritise geopolitical goals. Chinese foreign policy is not 
locked on a predetermined path, and while it has become more assertive under Xi, it is 
constructed by a plethora of domestic interests and institutions. In a best-case scenario, the 
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expansionist motives that underpin the BRI would become completely overrun by economic 
drivers and China’s pursuit of economic wellbeing for its people. 
In conclusion, supporting a giant Chinese geoeconomic initiative may seem counterintuitive 
to competitors such as the US. And while it is true that the BRI will most likely help China to 
attain its growth and development goals, this is not necessarily a bad thing, even for the US. 
Economic simulations show that the negative trade impacts of the BRI for the US would be 
close to zero, even if a BRI free trade zone were established.32 Also, and more importantly, 
there are indications that an economic downturn in China may lead the leadership to lash 
out against Taiwan as a way to distract an unhappy domestic audience if the CCP was 
struggling and left with no other option. 
It is therefore in the interest of the West that China’s economy remains stable and deeply 
integrated in the international trade and financial system, so that losses caused by severing 
these connections are almost unthinkable. To achieve this, participating in the BRI to shape 
China’s future foreign policy is the better option. Failure to do so is likely to increase the risk 
of a major conflict. 
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